

## ChinaBlog

video discorso di Cai Xia 蔡霞




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Ordina per:  
Relevance  
Relevance  
Date

### PAGINE

ChinaBlog

Cookie

Un Giorno da Ricordare, 4 Giugno 1989

la sbandata 2013

2014-Blog

2015-Blog

2016-Blog

2017-Blog

2018-Blog

## ZHANG ZHAN CONDANNATA, DENUNCIO' IL REGIME CINESE PER IL VIRUS DI WUHAN

Zhang Zhan

Coronavirus Cina

Wuhan Coronavirus

Covid-19

**VERGOGNA CINA!** Quattro anni di carcere per Zhang Zhan, avvocatessa di 37 anni e blogger cinese che raccontò la pandemia a Wuhan denunciando le bugie del regime di Xi Jinping sul coronavirus.

#WuhanCoronavirus #wuhanvirus #武汉肺炎 Frontline medical stuff have been working day and night in this horrible environment(corpses on the floor) and the wuhan government is "vanished". Short medical supply, no support or help. People are desperate-forwarded from 魔女小稀 [pic.twitter.com/5tRuR7Yn8d](https://pic.twitter.com/5tRuR7Yn8d)

— seven (@fifty35537556) January 24, 2020

## ChinaBlog

### 武漢生死一線 中央新春快樂

2020/1/24 — 10:50

武漢封城，連帶二三線城市黃岡、鄂州也都封城，一兩千萬人口(相當於一個歐洲小國)被困在疫區，聽天由命，這在世界歷史上，應屬最嚴重的瘟疫事件。

視頻所見，醫院人山人海，醫護人員在哭泣，超市搶購一空，民眾拚命外逃。這只是封城第一天的情況，十天八天後如何，一兩個月後如何，真不敢想像。

據聞中共已派出中部戰區軍隊入城，準備應付因封城導致的社會不穩。如何應付社會不穩？就是若有民眾因政府處事不當而不滿，群起反抗，軍隊會實行戒嚴，甚至武裝鎮壓。如此，武漢將面臨一次人類歷史上罕見的人道災難，天災與人禍合力，為害百姓。

在這種千鈞一髮的關頭，內地所有媒體的頭條，都是「中共中央舉行春節團拜會，習近平發表講話」。新聞所配發的圖片中，習近平笑容可掬，持咪發言，後面背景上寫著四個大字「福鼠賀歲」。

大佬，武漢人生死一線，分明災鼠橫行，你卻在笑迎福鼠，與眾同樂，會不會過份一點啊！

中共中央的春節團拜，不舉行會死人嗎？人民在災難中，你還有心情喜迎新歲，還以為洪福當頭，人民生命在你們心目中，真是如此不值一錢嗎？

武漢告急，醫護人員遠遠不足，病人排隊排隊排到街頭，至少，政府要先解決醫護人員不足的問題吧？全國大部份地區疫情都不算嚴重，以舉國之力，集中處理好武漢，不單保住武漢，也減少對其他省市的傳染機會。以中共集中力量辦大事的習慣，如在全國徵召醫護人員，派到武漢，至少減輕當地醫院的負擔。雖然，把醫護派到疫區，一定要自願性質，但一定有以天下為己任的醫護人員，願意冒生命危險去治病救人，不管去的人數是多是少，總之一定對減輕疫情有幫助。

武漢傳出的消息，醫藥用品嚴重不足，市場上物資短缺，百物騰貴，人民生活面臨極大困難，這種困難會越來越嚴重，越來越難以克服。封城之後，一千多萬人的日常生活如何安排供應，交通工具斷絕，如何解決調配物資的運輸問題，這些事情一想起來就令人頭皮發麻。在這種惡劣的情況下，還要過春節，真能硬起心腸來言笑晏晏，互道吉祥？

問題那麼多，百姓在生死線上掙扎，求助無門，網上大量哀告求助的貼子，都接近絕望了，但中共最先想到的，是派軍隊入城，準備社會動亂起來如何鎮壓救平。這是一個什麼樣的政權？封城之後，軍隊戒嚴，有任何風吹草動，都可以關起門來解決。怎麼解決？最終還不是捕人殺人，武力彈壓。這一套中共都做慣了，熟能生巧，外界概然不知，連世衛組織都對中共拜服得五體投地，而老百姓呢？他們的生死還算一回事嗎？

中國人真是慘，更慘的是，他們還不知道自己慘在哪裡。你在作生死掙扎，他在喜迎新春，他的迎春團拜比你的生死更是正經事，這樣的國家，你們還愛得下去，我真是服了你們。

香港這邊，林鄭政府至今不敢封鎖武漢來客，不敢在邊境安排措施檢疫，好像把可能帶毒的武漢來客拒諸門外，香港人就太不好客，太對不起他們了。但，你對得起香港人嗎？武漢自己都封城了，中共都不准武漢人外出，那香港政府下令拒收武漢湖北來客，又有什麼大逆不道？北韓金正恩是全世界第一個拒絕中國遊客的國家領導人，金正恩所有的事情都做錯，唯獨這件事手起刀落，毫不含糊，至少在這一點上，他比林鄭這個「好打得」的女人，更「好打得」得多。

香港政府近年以來，已經不肯站在香港人立場去考慮問題、決定政策，他們已經習慣於看中共臉色來解決香港內部問題。大概要不要採取決斷措施杜絕傳染，也得等習近平開金口才能決定吧，香港人的吉凶禍福，就寄托在習近平的一念之差上了。

不論如何，想起武漢人，還是感同身受，一場人道大災難在醞釀之中，禍一定是禍了，差別只在代價有多大。到底中國人是受了什麼詛咒，要遭此大難！到底中國人還要承受多少苦難，才能真正掌握自己的命運！

2020年第一隻黑天鵝，在中國大地盤旋，這隻不祥之鵝會掀起什麼樣的政治風暴，且讓我們拭目以待。

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## 陸官媒：台灣選舉遭外部暗黑力量操控 兩岸統一乃歷史大勢，不會因一場選舉改變

2020/1/12

蔡英文以超過 817 萬票破台灣紀錄之勢連任台灣總統，中國官媒《新華網》刊出題為「莫道浮雲終蔽日」的文章，指要「正告蔡英文和民進黨，不要因一時僥倖任性妄為，抱持台獨的幻想，又說中國強大、兩岸統一的歷史大勢」，是無法阻擋。

《新華網》指，蔡英文之所以贏，主要是三招，一是瘋狂「撒錢」進行政策買票，二是抹黑對手，三是煽動敵視大陸。同時，美國為牽制中國，加大打「台灣牌」的力度，蔡英文挾洋自重，借香港局勢煽風點火，形容這場「地區內部」選舉「很大程度上受到外部暗黑力量的操控」。

文章又指兩岸統一是「浩蕩大勢不可逆轉」，「一時之逆流不過是歷史浪潮下的泡沫」。兩岸發展基本格局不會因一場選舉改變，中國與台灣的實力對比日益懸殊，大陸已「牢牢掌握兩岸關係主導權」，有充分能力維護國家主權領土完整。

另外，中國外交部發言人耿爽在回應台灣選舉結果時說，台灣問題是中國的內政，重申中國堅持一個中國原則、反對「台獨」、反對「兩個中國」和「一中一台」的立場不會改變，相信國際社會將繼續堅持一個中國原則，理解和支持中國人民反對「台獨」分裂活動、爭取完成統一。

## Chinese Authorities Wrongfully Imprisoned Huang Qi and Should Release Him

July 30, 2019

<https://www.nchr.org/2019/07/chinese-authorities-wrongfully-imprisoned-huang-qi-and-should-release-him/>

(Chinese Human Rights Defenders—July 30, 2019) Chinese authorities should overturn the conviction of human rights defender [Huang Qi \(黃琦\)](#) and free him immediately. Mianyang

Intermediate Court in Sichuan [convicted](#) Huang of “intentionally leaking state secrets” and “illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities” on July 29 and handed him a 12-year combined sentence and 20,000 RMB (\$2,900 USD) fine. The court did not inform Huang’s mother of the hearing or sentencing. Huang Qi has been persecuted solely for the exercise of his right to freedom of expression and his work as a citizen journalist and activist. He has been denied the right to a fair trial, including being denied access to his lawyers, and has been subjected to torture. Authorities have deprived Huang of adequate medical treatment in detention and his health has deteriorated to such a degree that the 12-year prison sentence handed down yesterday could effectively be a death sentence.

The conviction and sentencing of Huang comes after a [closed-door trial](#) on January 14, a hearing which violated international standards for a fair trial. For the first 10 months of detention, police did not allow Huang any access to a lawyer. Once granted access to his attorneys, Huang reported to them that authorities had [tortured him](#) to try and force him to confess, which he refused to do. Judicial authorities have disbarred two of his lawyers, [Sui Muqing \(隋牧青\)](#) and [Liu Zhengqing \(刘正清\)](#), and Huang dismissed the other, Li Jinglin (李静林), during the January trial to protect Li from reprisals. Authorities [denied](#) lawyer Zhang Zanning (张赞宁), hired by his mother in February 2019, the right to meet with Huang and it is unclear if Huang had access to any legal counsel during the sentencing hearing.

Huang has been deprived of adequate medical treatment for kidney disease, accumulation of fluid in the brain, heart disease, and dangerously high blood pressure while being held at Mianyang City Detention Center. His health had deteriorated to such a degree that [14 human rights NGOs](#) and [4 UN independent human rights experts](#) issued statements at the end of 2018 calling for Huang’s release over concerns he could die in detention. Several human rights defenders and ethnic and religious minorities have [died](#) in detention in recent years due to a lack of prompt medical treatment, including [Ji Sizun](#), who died earlier this month, and [Liu Xiaobo](#), [Cao Shunli](#), [Yang Tongyan](#), and [Tenzin Delek Rinpoche](#). Huang and defenders like [Hu Shigen](#), and [Li Yuhan](#) are listed on CHRD’s [medical watch list](#) alongside 7 other HRDs who are being tortured by being deprived of adequate medical treatment in Chinese detention centers and prisons.

In April 2018, the independent experts on the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention determined that Huang’s detention was arbitrary and [issued an opinion](#) stating that the government must release him and provide him with state compensation for the harm done to him. Chinese authorities have defiantly ignored this opinion.



Huang Qi’s mother Pu Wenqing has suffered [retaliation](#) from authorities for her efforts to [campaign](#) for the release of her son. Police [disappeared](#) Pu, who is 86, from early December 2018 to January 21, after which she has faced [strict controls](#) on her movement and communications. She is [followed](#) 24/7 by police and restricted from giving interviews and speaking with friends and supporters. Pu’s health is [extremely poor](#) and she was recently diagnosed with lung cancer.

Police initially detained Huang in November 28, 2016 and arrested him the following month on charges of “illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities.” Authorities scheduled a trial for June 20, 2018 but then suspended it without providing a reason. In October 2018, police added an additional charge of “intentionally leaking state secrets.” The so-called “states secrets” in the case are [believed to be a document](#) from Mianyang City government and party officials that listed Huang Qi and 64 Tianwang as targets for a government crackdown, which Huang posted on their website in April 2016. Government officials then retroactively classified the document as “top secret,” taking advantage of criticized loopholes in China’s state secrets legislation. This is not the first time Chinese authorities have [retroactively](#) classified information when convicting someone.





Huang Qi established China's first-known human rights monitoring website in 1998, disseminating reports about Chinese individuals who had been trafficked and disappeared. Huang has already served two prison sentences, totalling eight years, in reprisal for his human rights work, and was often tortured and otherwise ill-treated. Born in 1963, Huang Qi graduated from Sichuan University and was formerly a businessman. His work in citizen journalism has received international awards, including two from Reporters Without Borders, which awarded 64 Tianwang the [Press Freedom Prize in 2016](#), and the [Cyber-Freedom Prize in 2004](#).

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<https://chinachange.org/2018/12/28/a-great-shift-unseen-over-the-last-forty-years/>

## A Great Shift Unseen Over the Last Forty Years

Xiang Songzuo, December 28, 2018

*On Dec. 16, Prof. Xiang Songzuo (向松祚) of Renmin University School of Finance and former chief economist of China Agriculture Bank, gave a 25-minute speech during a CEO class at Renmin Business School that was apparently applauded by the audience but immediately censored over the Chinese internet. Singling out 2018 as the year when China comes to a large shift unprecedented over the past 40 years, the speech can be seen as a landscape survey of Chinese economy, and obliquely, also of politics. Just as Tsinghua law professor Xu Zhangrun's (许章润) broadside "Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes", which was superbly translated and widely talked about among China watchers, Prof. Xiang's speech is another rare burst of Chinese intellectuals' discontent with the direction the country is taking under Xi Jinping. With this unauthorized translation of the speech, China Change wishes our readers a happy New Year! — The Editors*

I want to share two characters with my fellow alumni here. I hope that everyone present, every entrepreneur here, can reflect together with me. These two characters are fan si (反思, reflect). What do we reflect on?

China's economy has been going downward this year, as everyone knows. The year 2018 is an extraordinary year for us, with so many things taking place. But the main thing is the economic slowdown.

How bad are things? The number that China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) gives is 6.5 percent, but just yesterday, a research group of an important institution released an internal report. Can you take a guess on the GDP growth rate that they came up with using the NBS data?

They used two measurements. Going by the first estimate, China's GDP growth this year was about 1.67 percent. And according to the other calculation, the growth rate was negative.

Of course, my main point here is not about the accuracy of these calculations, or which one is more credible. But this year, there have been three issues regarding China that we either failed to consider, or about which we have made serious misjudgments.


First, the trade war between China and the U.S.. Did we make some inaccurate assessment? Did we underestimate the severity of the situation? Let's recall some slogans from the mainstream media at the beginning of the year: "In the trade war between U.S. and China, the Americans are lifting rocks only to smash them on their own feet, China is sure to win." "China will win the trade war without a doubt, be the battles big or small."

What's behind this kind of thinking? To this day, we keep suffering from a cognitive dissonance between our understanding of the Sino-U.S. trade war and the international reality. This calls for deep reflection.

Second, what was the cause for the economic downturn? Why did private enterprises suffer setbacks in 2018? Looking at the data, investment by private businesses has dropped substantially, so what made private business owners lose confidence? On November 1, the national leaders convened a high-profile economic conference, which some interpreted as a signal that the government wants to win back the confidence of private businesses as the economy worsens.

Since the beginning of the year, though, all kinds of ideological statements have been thrown around: statements like “private property will be eliminated,” “private ownership will eventually be abolished if not now,” “it’s time for the private enterprises to fade away,” or “all private companies should be turned over to their workers.” Then there was this high-profile study of Marx and the Communist Manifesto. Remember that line in the Communist Manifesto? Abolition of private property. What kind of signal do you think this sends to private entrepreneurs?

This is why we need to reflect on China’s economic downturn, the pressure on Chinese economy, and the trade war between the U.S. and China that is escalating with every passing day. We need to reflect on what we did wrong, on how to revive the economy as we walk into the future, and what steps we should take to ensure that China’s economy maintains its steady rate of growth.



You might not agree with what I say, and please feel free to give your opinions. But I hope that you can think in a sober manner after we finish today’s seminar. Why do I say this? Because the problems that we face are our own doing, and there are a lot of them. But many of them have been addressed in superficial terms only.

At the symposium on the private sector, General Secretary Xi Jinping talked about six issues. Among them I am most concerned about the sixth: the protection of personal safety and property. Think about it. In a country with robust rule of law, where everyone is equal before the law, shouldn’t these basic rights be properly guaranteed for everyone, entrepreneurs and commoners alike?

It has been four decades since the reform and opening up, yet the General Secretary still feels a need to specifically promote entrepreneurs’ rights to personal safety and the security of their property. This reflects the gravity of the issues facing the governance of Chinese society and state. In my view, China’s economy will face six internal challenges that deserve our serious consideration. Due to time constraints, I won’t be able to get through all of them.

In addition to this, there are three major external challenges. The first is the trade war, which is in fact no longer a trade war but rather a clash between two opposed value systems. It can be said with certainty that the Sino-U.S. relationship has come to a crossroads right now and faces significant historic challenges. What are we to do? To be honest, I don’t think we have really found much of a solution.

You are aware that Huawei’s CFO Meng Wanzhou was recently detained in Vancouver. In the past two days, mainstream media such as BBC and CNN have been reporting on how the U.S. is going at Huawei on all fronts. What this tells us is that this issue is not simply about trade or economics.

We used to speak of “China’s period of strategic opportunity for economic growth.” Does this period of strategic opportunity still exist? Personally, looking at the international situation, I think this period of strategic opportunity is fading quick.



Let’s think about what “international period of strategic opportunity” means. It means that in the past, international regulations have been favorable to us; we had open access to technology, capital, talent, and markets. Because of the imminent changes we face on the domestic and international fronts, I have titled today’s speech “the great shift unseen over the last forty years.” (四十年未有之大变局)

Have we really given the problems due consideration? Of course the short-term problem we are looking at is economic decline; the preponderance of data demonstrating this point needs no introduction here. Data concerning performance in November hasn’t been released, but you can extrapolate based on the October figures: there’s been a decline across virtually all sectors, from consumption in retail, autos, or real estate. Just look at China’s exports. Who can say that the trade war didn’t impact China and that China is sure to win the war no matter how big it is? Why don’t the people who were saying this kind of thing in April and May stand by their words now?

Why did we made such mistakes in assessing the international circumstances?

Look at these numbers. That China faces a long-term economic downturn is not a problem by itself. But you may have noticed that the consumption and the service sectors now make up 78.5 percent of GDP. Going by the government’s logic, this should be a good thing, since it means the economic transition to a consumption economy has been successful: we used to rely on investment and export, now we rely on consumption and the service sector. This sounds reasonable, but think about it: in a country like China, as investment slows dramatically, how can we maintain economic stability by solely relying on consumption?

The fact that consumption and services comprise 78.5 percent of GDP may be good news to some extent, but is far eclipsed by the negative implications. Take a look at investment. More importantly, can consumption alone support faster economic growth?

In the four decades following the economic reform, we have undergone five phases of consumption. The first was to solve the food problem, the second was the “New Big Three” [新三件, short for refrigerator, color TV, and washing machine], the third was the consumption of information, the fourth was automobiles, and fifth was real estate.

But these five waves have essentially all come to an end. Car sales have dropped sharply and real estate spending is also substantially decreasing, so we are facing serious problems. This is the crux of the [six stabilities](#) called for by the Politburo called for [stable employment, stable finance, stable foreign trade, stable foreign investment, stable investment and stable expectations], or as some internet users have joked, the six “tender kisses” [吻, kiss, is a homophone for 稳, stability].

Now, let me give you three more “kisses”: stable reserves, stable exchange rates, and stable housing prices.

It should be fairly obvious that these stabilities are difficult to achieve. For now it looks that “stable foreign investment” and “stable foreign exchange rates” shouldn’t be a problem.

Foreign investment is basically stable. But how can you stabilize investment, exports, real estate market, and employment? The reason that I want to share the word “reflect” with everyone today is that we need to reflect on why this happened, and on how to find an appropriate solution.

As economy slows, financial risk escalates and shadow banking shrinks rapidly. Some say that the president of China’s central bank has come out to apologize, saying that their prior policy was not well thought out, lacked coordination, and wasn’t properly implemented, that these, coupled with the effects of overbearing regulations, caused credit to recede. This is certainly an important reason, but it’s not the fundamental issue.

We can see that the direct financing market, whether the bonds or stock market, has been cut in half in 2018 and that many companies have defaulted. Total debt due to default has exceeded 100 billion RMB (\$14.5 billion) for the first three quarters.

According to data provided by the government, the corporate debt default could exceed 120 billion RMB, and many businesses have gone bankrupt. As Cao Dewang (曹德旺) put it, companies are collapsing in droves; not even state-owned enterprises are spared this phenomenon. Bohai Steel, once listed in the Fortune Global 500, was 192 billion RMB in debt when it bankrupted; the real number could be as high as 280 billion RMB.

Local debt is a big problem in China’s financial market. As for the actual number, the National Audit Office claims it to be about 17.8 trillion RMB, while He Keng (贺铿), vice director of National People’s Congress Financial and Economic Affairs Committee, thinks it’s over 40 trillion RMB. Worse yet, not one local government intends to pay back its debts.

So this is the larger context. Then there’s also the stock market crash. My friend Mr. Jin Yanshi (金岩石) will share with you shortly his thoughts about an impending stock market rebound, but in my opinion, it’s far from forthcoming. You can look at the history: only the Wall Street Crash of 1929 can compare to the steep decline that the Chinese stock has experienced this year. Many stocks are down 80 or even 90 percent.

So here’s a problem that we need to think about today: we know China’s stock market is feeling the pain, but what exactly is hurting?

Some people blame the securities regulators, Chairman Liu (刘主席), or this and that, but I think they are going after the wrong people. The problem lies in regulatory policy, which I fear may be lacking. The absence of comprehensive stock regulation might be an important issue, but it’s not the crucial one.

Look at our profit structure. To put it plainly, China’s listed companies don’t really make money. Then who has taken the few profits made by China’s more than 3,000 listed companies? Two-thirds have been taken by the banking sector and real estate. The profits earned by 1,444 listed companies on the SME board and growth enterprise board are not even equal to one and half times the profit of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. How can this kind of stock market become a bull market?

When we buy stocks, we are buying the profits of the company, not hype and rumors. I recently read a report comparing the profits of China’s listed companies with those in the U.S. There are many U.S. public companies with tens of billions dollars in profits. How many Chinese tech and manufacturing companies are there that have accomplished this? There is only one, but it’s not listed, and you all know which one that is. [Xiang is referring to Huawei, the Chinese tech company.] What does this tell us? As Yale professor Robert Shiller said: stock market performance may not work as a barometer of the economy in the short run, but it does for sure in the long run.

So I think that the terrible stock performance only demonstrates one thing, which is that the real economy in China is in quite a mess. Where is the stock market rebound? I think it’s obvious that investor confidence has yet to recover.

A number of policies came out on October 19 and 20, and Vice Premier Liu He (刘鹤) personally gave a speech to pledge results, but what of it now? The SSE Index fell to 2600 points by last Friday, and just stayed there, barely alive. When is the market rebound coming? Real estate is

not showing much cause for optimism right now, but I won't go into details for lack of time. You can take a picture of the data for your reference.

That's why China wants to fight the three tough battles. China's economic decline indicates that there is a major issue with the focus on expansion and growth: It has deviated from the fundamental and moved to speculation. These are the words of former chief of China's central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川).

What are our current financial risks? They are hidden, complex, acute, contagious, and malevolent. Structural imbalance are massive, and violations of law and regulations are rampant. There are black swans to prevent, and gray rhinos to stop. A reporter once asked Zhou, "Where are the black swans? Which ones?" Zhou smiled and did not answer.

The black swans are right next to you. The [P2P lending](#), blockchain, Coin Circle, aren't all these black swans? But you can't see them. As for the gray rhinos, they can charge at any time. The biggest of them is real estate.

We have rampant speculations everywhere, in too many aspects. In short, it's arbitrage.

During the national finance work conference last year, the General Secretary and the Premier strongly criticized the Chinese financial sector with a pile of literary-sounding polemics, saying that they were entertaining themselves without the slightest consideration for reality, and that the financial sector was in chaos and was a horrible sight to behold.

Apart from this financial arbitrage, what do most businesses do with their money? Forty percent of it goes to the stock market, speculation, and buying stocks of financial companies, but not investment into primary business. Then can this be considered a good situation for listed businesses? You can say goodbye to the equity pledges, game over. As an economist, I am opposed to the government bailing out the market. If stock pledges collapse, let it be: what's the point in bailing them out? What are you doing using stock pledges for other purposes anyway? What did you do with the loans you get from stock pledges?

I'm acquainted with many bosses of listed companies. Frankly speaking, a large part of their equity pledge funds did not go into their primary business, but used on speculation. They have many tricks. They buy financial products; they buy housing. The government said listed companies have spent 1-2 trillions on speculative real estate. Basically China's economy is all built on speculation, and everything is over leveraged.

Starting in 2009, China embarked on this path of no return. The leverage ratio has soared sharply. Our current leverage ratio is three times that of the United States and twice that of Japan. The debt ratio of non-financial companies is the highest in the world, not to mention real estate.

Having shared all this data with you, shouldn't we be arriving at a conclusion now?

"The swallows come back every three years." [This is a [reference](#) to the three years of RMB growth between 2005 and 2008.] Now they are back again. The economic decline has created a lot of pressure, so now the government brings back its old set of tricks: relaxed currency regulations, aggressive monetary policies, relaxed financial policies, and aggressive capital financing policy.

But now I want to ask a question. Everyone in the audience is an alumnae of Renda business school and capable of thinking independently, so give it some thought: Will these policies work? Can they solve China's fundamental problems? It's not that our currency regulation this year was not relaxed enough—we released 400 billion yuan in liquidity, 2.3 trillion yuan in hedging or medium-term lending facilities. 2.3 trillion times the money multiplier is about a dozen or so trillion.

Three monetary policy "arrows" have been fired, also known as "Bank Chief Yi's three arrows." The first is loans, the second is issuing debts, the third is to solve the problem of stock pledges. Even more mind-blowing was the "[125 Target](#)." [Guo Shuqing (郭树清), CCP committee secretary of the People's Bank of China and chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, said in November that banks' lending to private companies need to meet the "125 Target," which means that in new corporate loans, the big banks should issue no



less than one-third of the loans to private firms, medium and small banks should issue no less than two-third of the loans to private firms, and in three years the goal is for banks to lend no less than 50 percent of its loans to private enterprises among their loans to new companies.]

We recently went to the Pearl River Delta and some other regions to conduct field research, and locals told us that the local officials invited the bank chiefs over to meetings and told them which banks to turn to for loans. What is this nonsense?

So we need to reflect on our current problems: can these policies of ours solve the deeper issues?

As for the debt-for-equity swap, the capital market has issued many policies but I don't see any of them will really be useful. It's been another two months since October 19, have they been effective? So we have to ask ourselves: What has really gone wrong with our economy?

My own reflection has reached its conclusion: The problem with the Chinese economy is no longer speed or quantity, but quality.

The official report of the 19th Party Congress is an excellent report. So is the report of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. All of these major decisions were beautifully written and made all the right points. Sadly, they have not been followed through. The structural problems we face as a country, the "Six Big Imbalances," are not sufficiently addressed. Think about it, entrepreneurs and alumni of Renda business school in the audience, can any radical credit policy or monetary easing solve these problems?

Moreover, these credit and monetary policies can only make short-term adjustments that are incapable of fundamentally solving the "imbalances" I mentioned earlier. We are still trapped within the box of the old policy and the old way of thinking. The key to whether transformation will be successful is the vitality of private enterprises—that is, whether policy can stimulate corporate innovation.

We have been making a game of credit and monetary tools for so many years. Isn't this the reason we are saddled with so many troubles today? Speculation has driven housing prices sky-high.

The problems that private business actually faces are not difficulties in financing. What is it then? They are afraid of unstable policy and the government not keeping its word.

The leader of the State Council said it clearly in a meeting of the Standing Committee: in China, the government is what can be least trusted. Therefore, in order to solve the debt problem, first, the government has to pay back debts it owes businesses, the state-owned enterprises have to pay back debts they owe private enterprises, and large private enterprises have to pay back debts they owe smaller ones. The three costs keep going up [production cost, transnational cost, and systematic cost], therefore tax cut and fee reduction is the primary appeal.

My basic assessment of the overall issue is that these short-term monetary credit schemes are wholly incapable of solving the problem. For the Chinese economy to continue growing in a truly stable fashion, and extricate itself from its present quagmire, it must implement the following three essential reforms: tax system, reform in the political structure, and reform in state governance.

How to reduce taxes and fees? The structure of the government must be streamlined by cutting large numbers of staff. Personnel must be let go and expenditures have to drop, which means that structural reforms have to be carried out.

Professor Zhou Qiren (周其仁) of Peking University is someone I respect and admire deeply. All these years, he has been saying: what is China's biggest problem? The costs of societal administration are too high.

Then there are the matters of governmental reform and reforms in the structure of state governance. Of course, there's also reform of academia and research.

I hear that the day after tomorrow, there's going to be a grand conference to mark the 40th anniversary of the "reform and opening up." I sincerely hope that we'll hear something about

further deepening of reforms at that conference. Let's wait and see if any real progress can be made on these reforms.

If this doesn't happen, let me conclude on these words: the Chinese economy is going to be in for long-term and very difficult times.

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<https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/08/defrauded-p2p-investors-protest-quashed-in-beijing/>

## Defrauded P2P Investors' Protest Quashed in Beijing

In recent months, [the collapse of China's peer-to-peer \(P2P\) loan industry](#) has eradicated the life savings of many individuals who had put their money in the high-risk, high-return schemes. Once valued at 1.3 trillion yuan (US\$191 billion), [P2P](#) loans grew quickly in recent years and became a popular way for individual investors and small businesses to be connected with borrowers or lenders. But the industry has not been well-regulated, and a recent government [crackdown](#) and decreased liquidity have led to the collapse of hundreds of P2P platforms. New government regulations required P2P platforms to undergo a review and registration in June, but many failed to do so. In July, [165 lending platforms stopped allowing withdrawals, while other platform owners disappeared](#) with investors' money.

On Monday, thousands of P2P investors gathered in Beijing from around the country to protest outside the offices of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, [but were quickly intercepted and put on buses by police who had been awaiting their arrival.](#)

Chinese P2P crisis. People go to Beijing for help. But were striking by Chinese police!  
<pic.twitter.com/DS7E1T74uF>

— fromChina (@fromChi19817979) 6 agosto 2018

## Xi Jinping sbeffeggiato in diretta TV

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkCuv-rW6Gc>

## Schedatura di massa camuffata da programma sanitario

La denuncia di Human Right Watch

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>

(New York) – [Chinese](#) authorities in Xinjiang are collecting DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of all residents in the region between the age of 12 and 65, Human Rights Watch said today. This campaign significantly expands authorities' collection of biodata beyond [previous government efforts](#) in the region, which only required all passport applicants in Xinjiang to supply biometrics.

For all "[focus personnel](#)" – those authorities consider threatening to regime stability – and their family members, their biometrics must be taken regardless of age. Authorities are gathering the biodata in different ways. DNA and blood types are being collected through a free annual physical exams program called Physicals for All. It is unclear if the participants of the physicals are informed of the authorities' intention to collect, store, or use sensitive DNA data.

"Xinjiang authorities should rename their physical exams project 'Privacy Violations for All,' as informed consent and real choice does not seem to be part of these programs," said [Sophie](#)

Richardson, China director. “The mandatory databanking of a whole population’s biodata, including DNA, is a gross violation of international human rights norms, and it’s even more disturbing if it is done surreptitiously, under the guise of a free health care program.”

The biometric collection scheme is detailed in an official document called “The [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous] Region Working Guidelines on the Accurate Registration and Verification of Population” (全区人口精准登记核实工作指南, “The Population Registration Program”), available in full on the [government website](#) of Aksu city in Xinjiang (an unofficial translation is available below).

The guidelines are undated, but the Aksu government’s notice distributing it to lower-level offices was dated July 2, 2017. According to state media reports, the Xinjiang government [authorized the Population Registration Program in February 2017](#), and specified that it would be carried out “in stages.” A county government in Tacheng prefecture, for example, has a [timetable](#) that states it began collecting biodata around mid-June and completed it by end of November 2017. The Xinjiang-wide Physicals for All program [started](#) around July and was [completed](#) October 2017.

## 中国：少数民族地区上千万居民被采集DNA

公安机关假借公共卫生计划收集私密信息

According to the guidelines, different authorities are responsible for different types of biometric collection. Party cadres and police officers are responsible for collecting pictures, fingerprints and iris scans, and “household registration” (or *hukou*) information using mobile apps designed for such purpose either during home visits, or by setting up central collection points. Local health authorities are responsible for collecting DNA and blood type information “as part of” the Physicals for All program, according to the guidelines. The collected blood type information is directly sent to the police, while the “blood cards for DNA collection will be sent to the county police bureaus for profiling.” All of this information is stored and linked to an individual’s national identification number.

The guidelines say the biometric collection will be comprehensive: officials have “to ensure that [information from] every household in every village, every person in every household, every item for every person” will be collected. There is no indication that people can opt out of the collection, or any requirement of informed consent.

While media reports and [official implementing documents](#) about Physicals for All outline a range of medical tests involved, including ultrasounds, electrocardiograms, and “routine blood works,” they give no indication that DNA will be collected as part of the tests. It also does not appear that the government has disclosed to the public or to participants the full range of how collected medical information will be used and disseminated or how long it will be stored. While official media reports stress that participation in the Physicals for All [program should be voluntary](#), it appears that in practice people are expected – and sometimes pressured – to participate.

One Uyghur who participated in the 2016 Physicals for All program in Kashgar in western Xinjiang told Human Rights Watch that his neighborhood committee “had demanded that they [people in his neighborhood] must participate in the physicals.” He did not think he had a choice in the matter, as “not participating would surely be seen as a sign of ‘thought problem,’” a shorthand for “political disloyalty,” a dangerous label in the repressive region. He said the health authorities had not told him afterward the results of his physical.

“China has few meaningful privacy protections and Uyghurs are already subjected to extensive degrees of control and surveillance, including heavy security presence, numerous checkpoints, and routine inspection of smartphones for ‘subversive’ content,” Richardson said. “In this context, compulsory biodata collection has particularly abusive potential, and hardly seems justifiable as a security measure.”

An October 2017 report by the Ili health authorities says the government “[has to ensure that those who should participate in the physicals do participate](#).” While a June 2017 report by the *Ili Evening Post* says “[for those unwilling to participate in the physicals...cadres have to...work hard to convince them to participate](#),” suggesting that officials may put pressure on residents who refuse to take part. This practice is not consistent with international human rights norms which require that medical interventions, including medical tests, be conducted only with the free and informed

consent of the individual.

A Xinhua article dated November 1, 2017, states that 18.8 million people participated in the Physicals for All program in 2017.

The guidelines suggest that biometric collection is a permanent measure. Police are now required to ensure that all such information is collected from anyone in Xinjiang before they conduct any "hukou-related business," such as enrolling in public schools and applying for passports. Even people who have Xinjiang *hukou* but live outside the region are required to submit such information to "the Xinjiang Population Services and Management Committee(s) in the Mainland."

A number of local governments in different parts of Xinjiang – [Yining county](#), [Tacheng prefecture](#), [Tiemenguan city](#) (which is part of the Xinjiang Military Corps), [Korla city](#), and [Jinghe county](#) – have issued local versions of the directives instructing the collection of biometrics. The directives in Ili and Tacheng largely reproduce the provincial-level guidelines verbatim. In Tiemenguan, though, the collection of DNA is limited to those aged 14 to 65. The Tiemenguan directive also instructs the propaganda authorities to be responsible for "monitoring public sentiments on the internet" about the biometric collection and to "guide and handle negative information."

## La Cina Comunista rifiuta i "lavoratori di fascia-bassa", "low-end population"

Un tempo si chiamavano "proletari" ed erano i protagonisti delle visioni politiche dei movimenti marxisti, dalla rivoluzione industriale a quella cinese di Mao.

### Chi sono i migrant workers

Ora sono una presenza necessaria, perché sfruttati, ma da nascondere, come gli appestati, e il regime di Xi Jinping cerca di cacciarli dalla vista dei cittadini "normali": sono i lavoratori migranti, 280 milioni di cinesi strappati dalle terre e portati a lavorare nei megacantieri delle metropoli o nelle fabbriche più pericolose per i lavori più sottopagati.

Esistono da sempre, sono gli schiavi che da Deng a Xi Jinping hanno costruito fabbriche e città dove non c'era nulla, nascosti agli occhi dei turisti e alle telecamere, ma il 18 novembre sono tornati alla ribalta **per un episodio che il regime ha considerato come un pretesto** per cacciarli dalla capitale Pechino.

Un incendio di vaste proporzioni distrugge un palazzo-fabbrica e provoca 19 morti.

Le autorità danno la colpa alle migliaia di "low-end population" che vivono ammassati nelle baraccopoli attorno ordinano uno sfratto di massa, ovvero una deportazione, per decine di migliaia di essi, dopo aver raso al suolo le baracche.

Nasce una protesta spontanea e diffusa sui social che la censura blocca immediatamente.

Ecco un frammento sfuggito ai censori

Twitter user @alicedreamss shared a clip from the television talk show "Laborers Poems and Songs" (劳动者的诗与歌), in which several young [migrant workers](#) affected by the crackdown recite a poem by Yu Xiuhua rejecting the "low-end" label. Yu Xiuhua is one of China's most widely-read [poets](#), sometimes referred to as [China's Emily Dickinson](#). CDT has translated @alicedreamss tweet and Yu Xiuhua's poem below:

□

<https://twitter.com/twitter/statuses/935892036078641152>

### The Youth of Picun Village

Hi everyone:

I am Xiao Hai (小海) from Poems and Songs of Laborers. A big fire has affected each and every one of us. Moving, relocation, and eviction have left us with no place to go. Whenever such major accidents happen, we see tremendous contrast between the confidence of those who post public notices and the distressed, panicked, helpless, and numb expressions on the faces of fellow workers who are busy moving out. I feel that we, who have existed in these narrow spaces, have kept our silence for too long. We too must make our voice heard. Where on earth can we go? Reality does not happen in grand offices or in conference rooms. Reality happens in crowded places, in the cold wind, in the streets!

Now, together with my fellow workers, I will read a poem called "Let's Go, Children, with the North Wind of Beijing," by Ms. Yu Xiuhua (余秀华):

Leave the sunshine to tomorrow  
Leave it to the high-end people to glorify  
Leave the happiness to tomorrow  
Leave it to the high-end people  
Leave the hope to tomorrow  
Leave it to the high-end people

But let despair stay  
The despair that is left to stay  
Will be high-end despair

We have no place to go  
But we are on the territory of the motherland  
Wearing thin clothes in the cold  
We are on the territory of the motherland  
We own nothing at all

The motherland is all we have  
The motherland in the Beijing accent  
The motherland in dialects  
The motherland in office buildings  
The motherland in rental rooms  
This motherland also belongs to them  
To those who post the notices  
To those who break the windows  
To those who rob us when we are in a plight

Children, you must trust me  
We live in a low place  
But it is not low-end  
You don't attend aristocratic schools  
But it is not low-end  
Even though you are in rags  
You are still not low-end

The low-end owns the narrow-mindedness of the low-end people  
The kind-hearted have the tolerance of the kind-hearted people.

<https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/12/translation-child-beijings-cold-winds-behind/>

**Nectar Gan in the South China Morning Post reports** on one NGO worker who provides services to Beijing's migrant population:

The municipal authorities have denied the most recent sweep targets the so-called low-end population of migrant workers and their families, insisting the main goal is to tackle threats from unlicensed buildings.

But the effect has been to force men, women and children onto the street at the start of winter.

That prompted Yang, 43, to swing into action. In March he had opened the drop-in centre called Tongzhou Home, meaning “in the same boat”, providing a range of free services such as movie nights, haircuts and table tennis for migrant workers – all supported by donations from the public.

That night, as he waited for word to spread, Yang was visited by police officers who told him to cease and desist. The officers watched as he deleted the online appeal, returning the next day to tell him to shut down Tongzhou Home. [\[Source\]](#)



## Chinese poet Langzi detained after commemorating late Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo

HKFP - 7 September 2017 09:30 Catherine Lai

A well-known poet from the southern province of Guangdong has been detained after he helped produce an anthology of poems commemorating the late Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo.

Wu Mingliang, who is better known by his pen name Langzi, was taken from his home by police officers and criminally detained on August 18 upon suspicion of illegal business operations, according to Amnesty International.

Segui

Altro

Chinese feminists in Times Square demand that Weibo stop its [#FeministBan](#)

▫

“They Target My Human Rights Work as a Crime”

▫

[Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China \(2016\)](#)

<https://chinachange.org/tag/lu-yuyu/>

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<https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/09/26/case-against-two-citizen-journalists-who-compiled-china-protest-blog-transferred-for-prosecution/>

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## Zhou Youguang è morto all'età di 111 anni

□

Linguist Zhou Youguang, the man who helped invent the Pinyin system used for writing Chinese worldwide before becoming an outspoken critic of the communist government died Saturday in Beijing. He was 111.

Zhou, who was probably China's oldest dissenter, died Saturday at his house in the country's capital, a day after having celebrated his 111th birthday, state media said.

"He lived through many eras and helped enlighten ordinary people," the Communist Party mouthpiece the People's Daily said.

Zhou is commonly known as the "father of Pinyin", a system for transliterating Chinese characters into the Roman alphabet introduced in the 1950s and now used by hundreds of millions of language learners in China, as well as abroad.

## 64tianwang.com premiato da Reporters Sans Frontiers

□

Paris-based press freedom group Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and France's TV5 Monde awarded the Press Freedom Prize to detained citizen journalists Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu at a ceremony in Strasbourg on Tuesday.

The "**64Tianwang**" website won the media category, because its reporters take great risks to keep the Chinese people informed about the country's civil rights movement, RSF said in a statement. It cited the detention of five of Tianwang's citizen journalist contributors ahead of the G20 leadership summit in the eastern city of Hangzhou in September.

"But their determination does not flag," RSF said, adding that none of Tianwang's contributors has signed a "confession" proffered by the authorities in 18 years of activity.

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## Arrestato per colpa della T-shirt di Xitler

China Detains Jilin Activist For Wearing Anti-Xi Jinping T-Shirt

Chinese authorities have secretly detained a graduate of a U.S. university who supported human rights and pro-democracy campaigns after he told friends he would wear a T-shirt merging the name of President Xi Jinping with Hitler's.

Ethnic Korean Quan Ping, whose name is also spelled in its Korean form, Kwon Pyong, is being held by police in his hometown of Yanji city in the northeastern province of Jilin, and has been incommunicado for more than a month, RFA has learned.

Kwon Pyong's detention came after he posted a selfie outside a government building while wearing a T-shirt with banned keywords linked to President Xi, including the word "Xitler." He also told a friend he planned to walk around wearing it on Oct. 1, the anniversary of the founding of communist-ruled China.

A vociferous next-generation rights activist and graduate of Iowa State University, Kwon, now 28, traveled to take part in the 2014 Occupy movement for fully democratic elections in Hong Kong.

<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/activist-11022016120902.html>

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## Wukan 16 sept 2016

▫

Members of the Democratic Party demonstrate in front of the Hong Kong Central Government office on behalf of local reporters detained and beaten covering protests in Wukan, China, Sept. 15, 2016.

▫ RFA

Five Hong Kong journalists have been detained, dragged into interrogation rooms for hours and expelled by authorities in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong after they tried to cover a crackdown by armed police on the rebel village of Wukan following weeks of peaceful protests.

The journalists had been sent to cover clashes between riot police and local residents in the village, where thousands of local people have been protesting the jailing of their former leader Lin Zulan on "bribery" charges.

*Ming Pao* staff association chairwoman Phyllis Tsang said two of the newspaper's reporters had traveled to Wukan alongside a reporter for the English-language *South China Morning Post* newspaper.

They were all detained, she said.

## Wukan 13 Sept 2016

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## The People in Retreat, di Ai Xiaoming

Film documentario in cinese con sottotitoli in cinese

## Wukan 08-sept-2016

▫

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Ai Weiwei's statement on being removed from the MoCA Yinchuan Biennale:



I have just learnt that my artwork has been excluded due to my "political sensitivity". Censorships in communist regions have been present since the existence of the power. Yet it still comes as a surprise to me for an "international art biennale", with over a hundred international artists and a foreign curator participating, to remove a single artist for the reason of defending human rights and freedom of speech. This shows what we face is a world which is divided and segregated by ideology, and art is used merely as a decoration for political agendas in certain societies.

China is trying to develop into a modern society without freedom of speech, but without political arguments involving higher aesthetic morals and philosophies, art is only served as a puppet of fake cultural efforts.

Therefore I am happy not to be a part of that effort as a political decoration. I believe the real effort we should make, is in defending freedom of speech for our humanism. Only by doing so, art is worth making.

<https://www.instagram.com/p/BJfuZXNDytn/>

### Cessation of Publication Notice for Yanhuang Chunqiu

□

On July 12, 2016, the Chinese National Academy of Arts illegally and unilaterally tore up the "Written Agreement Between the Chinese National Academy of Arts and Yanhuang Chunqiu Journal" which both sides had signed, announcing the reorganization of our leadership structure, seriously violating the public's right to freedom of publication enshrined in [Article 35 of the constitution](#), and infringing on the autonomy of personnel matters, distribution, and financial affairs it had clearly accepted in the Written Agreement. On July 15, Academy staff forced their way into our offices and stole and changed the passwords for managing the Yanhuang Chunqiu website. As a result, our publication has lost the basic prerequisites for editing and publishing.

In view of this and after much discussion, Yanhuang Chunqiu's organizing committee has unanimously agreed to cease publication from this day forward. Anyone publishing under the "Yanhuang Chunqiu" banner in future will have nothing to do with the original operators.

It is hereby announced.

Legal Representative for Yanhuang Chunqiu: [Du Daozheng](#)

July 17, 2016

**29/06/2016**

## Blogger Lu Yuyu Detained for "Picking Quarrels"

□

Friends and associates of citizen journalist Lu Yuyu, known as @wickedonnaa on Twitter, feared he had been taken away by police on June 14, when his frequently updated social media accounts went silent. Chinese Human Rights Defenders has now confirmed that he has been detained, along with his girlfriend Li Tingyu, on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble"

Follow

CHRD人权捍卫者 @CHRDnet

Citizen journalists Lu Yuyu (corrected: not "Lu Riyu") & Li Tingyu @wickedonnaa transferred to unknown detention ctr <https://twitter.com/weiquanwang/status/747187442189369346> ...

1:35 AM - 27 Jun 2016

12 12 Retweets 2 2 likes

Follow

William Nee @williamnee

Blogger Lu Yuyu & girlfriend Li Tingyu criminally detained in charge of "picking quarrels & provoking trouble". <https://twitter.com/wenyunchao/status/746691008163885056> ...

6:23 AM - 26 Jun 2016

20 20 Retweets 4 4 likes

The charge “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” has been increasingly used in recent years against a wide variety of activists, lawyers, and writers. While the direct cause of Lu’s detention is not yet known, Lu is known for his work posting information about protests and other mass incidents around China. Friends have noted that he may have tried to report from Wukan, Guangdong, where protests broke out last week over the dismissal of the elected village chief. Oiwan Lam reports for Global Voices:

Since June 14, the @wickedonna account has posted no new updates. Lu’s friend @youyuping alerted followers on June 20:

Follow

Pepee—皮皮游 @youyuping

紧急寻人，这位敏感新闻自媒体 @wickedonnaa 失踪了。

4:28 PM - 20 Jun 2016

36 36 Retweets 4 4 likes

“Urgently seeking missing person, @wickedonnaa, a highly sensitive news outlet [founder] has gone missing.”

On Weibo, Lu’s friend @ZGHQW99 is also looking for him:

“Lu Yuyu has been researching mass incidents across the country since 2011 and distributing the news on Sina Weibo and Twitter. He has been doing this non-stop for years so that netizens from China and overseas can see people’s suffering in China. Even [Party-affiliated] Hongqi’s ‘Worker and Peasant’ column has republished his writings. Last week, Lu went missing and out of contact. Even his relative’s mobile phone is unanswered. Please pay attention to this.” [Source]

In 2014, Yaqiu Wang profiled Lu for Tea Leaf Nation, describing his daily work of archiving news about protests:

Lu archives several dozen to more than two hundred incidents a day. He preserves pictures, descriptions of the events, comments from participants, and links to the source posts. Lu is able to avoid having his Internet cut-off by local police by using wireless Internet cards. As a result, his IP address changes constantly. [Source]

## “非新闻”创办人卢昱宇或因乌坎报道被“寻衅滋事罪”抓捕(图)

(维权网信息中心报道)2016年6月24日星期五，本网获悉：民间维权事件的网上平台“非新闻”创办人卢昱宇与其女友李婷玉失踪9日后，他被证实遭当局在6月16号下午4点以“寻衅滋事罪”抓捕。现拘押于大理看守所。卢昱宇是贵州人。

卢昱宇被抓捕疑因乌坎村维权事件受打压有关，有消息指当局为堵截乌坎网上消息而将他拘捕。“非新闻”运作3年以来，一向相安无事，亦没有听过卢昱宇被打压的消息，怀疑卢昱宇这次失踪，是与现在广东省陆丰市乌坎村，发生土地维权事件有关。

有维权人士卫小兵和南方老头赴卢昱宇女友李婷玉家乡佛山寻人，见到卢李婷玉的父亲。他说，女儿上大学时对当局持反对立场，曾被国宝约谈，四年没跟家里联系了。维权人士准备让他写份委托书，以便律师介入，对方表示要和其母商议再回复。

对于卢昱宇与其女友李婷玉的境况，本网将持续关注。

### 19/6/2016

L'arresto di Lin Zuluan, sindaco del villaggio di Wukan che osò sfidare il regime per difendere le terre dei contadini contro l'esproprio a favore dei costruttori di regime, è la vendetta del Partito contro il più importante esperimento di cambiamento democratico in Cina.

□

Centinaia di poliziotti in assetto paramilitare sono entrati a Wukan di notte e hanno prelevato il settantenne Zuluan dalla sua casa, con l'accusa formale di “atti di corruzione e appropriazione” completamente infondata ma che è servita al duplice scopo di infangare Lin Zuluan e soffocare le immediate proteste degli abitanti del villaggio, minacciati di repressione violenta dalle autorità di governo.

Non si sa quali siano le condizioni di Zuluan e tutto il villaggio di Wukan, a pochi chilometri da Hong Kong, è praticamente sotto assedio.

Gli abitanti di Wukan avevano iniziato la loro battaglia contro la speculazione edilizia e l'espropriazione dei terreni agricoli nel 2011, e nel 2012 è esplosa di nuovo una rivolta per protesta contro l'uccisione di Xue Jinbo, uno dei loro leader, dopo un pestaggio ad opera della polizia.

I cittadini del villaggio cacciarono i rappresentanti corrotti del Partito ed imposero l'elezione diretta di un nuovo capo-villaggio e la scelta cadde su Lin Zuluan. Ora è arrivata la vendetta del regime.

- <http://www.dw.com/en/chinese-police-block-wukan-village-ahead-of-anti-corruption-protests/a-19340037>
- <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1977073/chinese-residents-slam-police-thugs-after-arrest>
- <https://next.ft.com/content/f39ab3c2-35dd-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f>
- <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/china-wukan-leader-arrested-160619034526131.html>
- <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-wukan-idUKKCN0Z405Q>

08/04/2016



## PANAMA PAPERS

<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/04/minitruue-delete-content-related-panama-papers-2/>


*The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. The name of the issuing body has been omitted to protect the source.*

All websites: please self-inspect and delete all content related to the "Panama Papers" leak, including news reporting, microblogs, WeChat, forums, community pages, bulletin boards, cloud storage, comments and other interactive media. Delete mobile content at the same time. (April 4, 2016) [[Chinese](#)]

The documents detail the ownership and operations of offshore shell companies involving, among hundreds of others, "[family members of at least eight current or former members of China's Politburo Standing Committee](#)." These include relatives of President Xi Jinping, former Premier Li Peng, former Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin and, according to more recent reports, [current Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli and propaganda chief Liu Yunshan](#).

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### Lo scandalo dei vaccini avariati

<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1931209/vaccine-scandal-highlights-publics-lack-trust-chinese>

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## Hello Comrade Xi Jinping,

*We are loyal Communist Party members. On the occasion of the national "Two Sessions," we write this letter asking you to resign from all Party and state leadership positions. We make this request out of consideration for the Party cause, out of consideration for the nation and its people—and also out of consideration for your personal safety and that of your family.*

*Comrade Xi Jinping, since your election as General Secretary at the Party's 18th National Congress, your determination to fight corruption by "beating tigers" has led to some improvement in the unhealthy tendency of internal Party corruption. Your personal leadership on several Central Leading Groups working towards comprehensive reform, as well as the great amount of work you've made on economic development, has received some public support, and these efforts have not been unnoticed by us.*

*However, Comrade Xi Jinping, we have no choice but to point out that, precisely due to your gathering of all power into your own hands and making decisions directly, we are now facing unprecedented problems and crises in all political, economic, ideological, and cultural spheres.*

*In the political sphere, your abandonment of important Party tradition, including most significantly the abandonment of the democratic system of the collective leadership of the Standing Committee, instead having all leaders at all levels support your position at the "core," has resulted in an excessive concentration of power. While strengthening the power of the Party Committees within the NPC, CPPCC, and the State Council, you've weakened the independent power of all state organs, including that of Premier Li Keqiang and others. Meanwhile, the stationing of Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission patrols in work units and state-owned enterprises has created a new system of power, leading to a lack of clarity at all levels of government, and confusing the decision-making process.*

*In the diplomatic sphere, your abandonment of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's consistent "hide your strength and bide your time" policy, has not only failed to create a favorable international environment, but has allowed North Korea to complete successful nuclear tests, creating an enormous threat to China's national security; has allowed the United States' successful return to Asia, forming a united front with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Southeast Asian countries to jointly contain China.*

*In handling the Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan problems, lack of compliance with Comrade Deng Xiaoping's wise concept of "one country, two systems" has created a further dilemma, allowing the Democratic Progressive Party to win power in Taiwan and letting sentiment of Hong Kong independence to rise. Of particular concern regarding Hong Kong, the irregular manner of bringing booksellers to the mainland has directly injured the "one country, two systems" policy.*

*In the economic sphere, as the head of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, your direct involvement in the development of micro- and macroeconomic policy has created instability in the stock market and property market, allowing the wealth of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people to vanish. Supply side reforms and production capacity policies have resulted in large numbers of layoffs at state-owned firms; and the closing of private firms have also led to many layoffs. The "One Belt, One Road" initiative has put a huge amount of foreign exchange reserves into chaotic countries and regions with no return. The excessive consumption of foreign exchange reserves, and renminbi devaluation cycles, has made everyone's confidence decline, has brought the national economy to the verge of collapse. People want change.*

*On the ideological sphere, your emphasis of the "Media's Party surname," has disregarded the media's character of representing the people, and the entire country is stunned; your support of Zhou Xiaoping and Hua Qianfang as representatives on the literary front has left countless literary and art workers in bitter disappointment; your direct condoning of cultural units to sing your praises, and the appointment of your wife Peng Liyuan's sister as director and producer of the CCTV Spring Festival Gala, has turned the once popular Gala into your personal propaganda tool. Your condoning this cult of personality, disallowing "improper discussion" of the central government, and "one-voice Party" method, make those of us who experienced the Cultural*


*Revolution unable to not secretly worry—our Party, country, and people cannot bear another decade of calamity!*

*Comrade Xi Jinping, your carrying out a high-pressure anti-corruption campaign to correct unhealthy tendencies in the Party has had a helpful effect, but, since there are no supporting measures or objectives, it has given rise to an abundance of "slackness" at all levels of government, with officials too afraid to work, discontent openly voiced by the people, and the deterioration of our economy exacerbated. We also see the main goal of the anti-corruption campaign to be merely a power struggle. We are worried that this type of inner-Party power struggle may also bring risks to the personal safety of you and your family. Consequently, Comrade Xi Jinping, we feel that you do not possess the capabilities to lead the Party and the nation into the future, and we believe that you are no longer suitable for the post of General Secretary.*

*For the Party cause, for the long-term peace and stability of the country, and for your own personal safety and that of your family, **we ask you to resign from all positions of Party and state leadership**, and let the Party Central Committee and the people of the nation select a virtuous leader who can vigorously lead us into the future.*

*Loyal Communist Party Members March, 2016*

**16-03-2016**



14-03-2016.

La rabbia dei minatori cinesi della Longmay Mining Holding Group, una delle principali aziende di estrazione del carbone in Cina, esplode a Shuangyashan, nella provincia di Heilongjiang.

I minatori non vengono pagati da molti mesi, sono al limite della sopportazione.

Rappresentano una realtà che le autorità di governo hanno deciso di "riconvertire" con un metodo semplice: affamandoli, negando diritti elementari e reprimendoli con l'uso della forza e della censura. Sono le vittime di una politica di sviluppo insensata, della corruzione e della commistione tra politici e affarismo.

*Da AFP : "I'm on my knees, my family can't eat," an elderly woman pleaded with a man who*

appeared to be a government official.

"Tell me, how can we live?" she shouted, before collapsing and being rushed away by fellow protesters.

The situation in Heilongjiang exemplifies the dilemma faced by Chinese authorities, who say they want to reform the world's second-largest economy and at the same time seek to avoid unrest.

Le immagini della protesta dei minatori di Shuangyashan sono state censurate.

Menoopiù Blog è in grado di mostrarle.

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## 12-03-2016

Lettera del giornalista Zhou Fang del giornale di Stato Xinhua contro la censura di Stato

### 新华社现任记者周方实名公开信控告中共网络主管部门

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[http://bowenpress.com/news/bowen\\_74189.html](http://bowenpress.com/news/bowen_74189.html)

La lettera aperta che Zhou Fang, giornalista di Xinhua, ha scritto ai vertici del partito riuniti in sessione plenaria ha avuto un'eco internazionale (in Cina è stata subito censurata e rimossa) perchè denuncia la stretta repressiva di Xi Jinping contro le libertà di espressione e l'insofferenza crescente anche dentro le fila degli apparati di Stato.

03-03-2016

sciopero alla Delphi

**3 Marzo americana Delphi Packard Electric Systems Co., Ltd Guangzhou succursale 2.000 lavoratori in sciopero per protestare contro l'azienda si trasferisce nessuna compensazione, vi è un gran numero di poliziotti è arrivata sul posto per bloccare i diritti dei lavoratori, i lavoratori saranno un ferito e catturato uno. Delphi Packard Electric Systems Co., Ltd Guangzhou Branch si trova nel modo orientale Stati Cang al 1 ° distretto di Huangpu di Guangzhou lo sviluppo economico e tecnologico della zona, nella provincia del Guangdong, dagli Stati Uniti Delphi Automotive Systems (China) Co., Ltd. unico proprietario, la produzione e la produzione di sistemi di distribuzione di potenza e di segnale automotive principale i pezzi di ricambio.**

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20-02-2016

Governare con il Terrore

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

<https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/02/20/reform-china-rise-rule-fear/>

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


In Cina sta per iniziare l'anno della Scimmia, e milioni di persone si mettono in viaggio per il periodo di festa.




Ma il lavoratori che hanno costruito la nuova autostrada di Shaoguan nel Guangdong non vengono pagati da mesi e non potranno certamente festeggiare il capodanno.

Per protesta hanno occupato l'autostrada, bloccando migliaia di automobilisti.









<http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/nurses-several-chinese-cities-strike-over-low-pay-and-benefits>

Nurses in several Chinese cities strike over low pay and benefits

The central province of Anhui has been the epicentre of the nurses' strike action in China, with at least three protests in the last six months including a high-profile protest the Fuyang People's Hospital on 28 August 2015, which focused on reduced bonuses and demands for better working conditions and equal pay for equal work.

A key issue in the Fuyang strike, and for nurses in nearly all of China's public hospitals, is the often very wide gap in pay and conditions between formal staff and contract workers. As an article published on CN-healthcare.com (健康界) in September noted, hospital managers resort to no end of "dirty tricks" to prevent nurses and other healthcare workers from gaining formal employment status, something which should entitle them to the same benefits as civil servants.

The low pay and unfair work practices at China's public hospitals mean that administrators can often rely on nursing staff quitting before they can obtain formal employment status, and then replacing them with young, inexperienced staff on short-term contracts, a device the article referred to as the hospitals' "population dividend."

These recent strikes follow a series of protests by hospital workers in 2013 and 2014 over violent attacks on doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals. The publicity given to these sometimes fatal attacks prompted the government to issue new guidelines criminalizing a wide-range of physical and verbal acts directed against medical staff. There is little evidence however that safety for medical staff has improved significantly as a result.

One of the most pressing problems for nurses and other healthcare workers in China is the lack of a professional trade union that can address the issue of workplace violence, low pay and job security and represent employees in talks with management over better pay and conditions.

There are hospital trade unions in China but their primary function is to act as a bridge between the Communist Party and the staff and help hospital management "create a fair, democratic and harmonious working environment that gives full play to the staffs' potential." In privately-run hospitals, if there is a union at all, it will most likely be controlled by management, much in the same way that enterprise trade unions in factories are.

As a result, nurses and other healthcare professionals usually have no option but to organize themselves and take forceful collective action if they want to improve their pay and working conditions.

## menoopiu' blog - le mie opinioni - politica ambiente diritti società

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*"Meno o Più" è l'opzione, difficile e nascosta, che ci si presenta in innumerevoli situazioni, nella vita individuale come in quella sociale. Un'opzione che si potrebbe rappresentare anche con l'alternativa "escalation" o "de-escalation", mi è sembrato più semplice "menoopiu", con il meno prima del più.*

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Non può pertanto considerarsi un prodotto editoriale ai sensi della legge num. 62 del 7/3/2001.

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